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Abstract 
A tax competition model is presented to investigate the effects of tax havens on the public good 
provision. We show that when countries facing a rise in tax havens change their tax 
enforcement strategies in response, the existence of tax havens may result in a higher level of 
equilibrium public good provision as compared to the case with no tax havens. Accordingly, tax 
havens could be welfare-enhancing for non-haven countries. This result offers a possible 
explanation for the recent empirical evidence that the corporate tax revenues in high-tax 
countries have actually increased with the growth in the flow of FDI to tax havens.  
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1. Introduction 
 The impact of tax havens on high-tax countries has attracted much attention and 
debate in recent years. It is often argued that tax havens erode the tax base of high-tax 
countries by providing opportunities for tax avoidance (OECD, 1998, 2000). The 
standard tax competition model essentially predicts that tax havens intensify tax 
competition among jurisdictions and reduce the public good provision (Slemrod and 
Wilson, 2009). The empirical evidence, by contrast, seems to suggest that the concern 
about the harmful effects of tax havens may be overstated. For example, based on US 
data, Dharmapala (2008) shows that despite increasing foreign direct investment (FDI) 
flows to tax havens, the US corporate tax revenues have actually increased, instead of 
having fallen. In Europe, the share of corporate income taxes in total revenues of 
OECD countries has been rising as well over the 1975-2005 period (OECD, 2008).  
 To explain the above phenomenon, we present a tax competition model in which 
countries facing the rise of tax havens choose a tax enforcement policy in response. 
As pointed out by Wilson (1999), there are many ways in which the governments can 
compete for mobile factors. One of the policy instruments that are recognized to play 
an important role in tax competition is the tax enforcement policy.1 When dealing 
with the issue of tax havens, the tax enforcement policy is particularly relevant since 
the use of tax havens is essentially a tax avoidance activity. Hence, we extend the 
literature on the welfare effect of tax havens by considering a tax enforcement 
competition game between non-haven countries.  
 More specifically, we assume that in the initial equilibrium the governments 
                                                 
1
 There are a number of studies analyzing the role of tax enforcement policy in a tax competition 
model. For example, Cremer and Gahvari (1997, 2000) consider two countries that compete with each 
other by using tax rate and audit probabilities. Peralta et al. (2006) analyze a tax competition game in 
which countries compete for the profit by means of a corporate tax rate and a tax enforcement variable. 
Haufler and Schjelderup (2000) and Bucovetsky and Haufler (2008) study the optimal regulation of 
multinational firms when governments can choose both the tax rate and the tax base (or the degree of 
tax discrimination). These papers do not, however, deal with the issue of tax havens. 
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choose a capital income tax rate to finance the public good and to compete for mobile 
capital, as in standard tax competition models. Then, tax havens arise. With the 
existence of tax havens, the firms in non-haven countries can set up affiliates in tax 
havens, and direct interest payments to these affiliates to reduce their tax burden. In 
response to the rise of tax havens, two scenarios may emerge. The first scenario is that 
non-haven governments adjust their capital tax rate (i.e., engage in a tax rate 
competition game, TRC), and the second scenario is that they vary the tax 
enforcement policy (i.e., turn it into a tax enforcement competition game, TEC). 
In our theoretical model, tax enforcement policies can specifically refer to any 
multinational tax regulations such as, for instance, the thin capitalization rules, the 
transfer-pricing rules, or controlled foreign corporation rules. These regulations are 
mostly imposed to counter the use of tax havens and are changed more frequently 
than the statutory tax rate. In the US, for example, the present corporate income tax 
rate was adopted in the Tax Reform Act of 1986, while the thin capitalization rule was 
added to the Code by the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989. Since then, the 
thin capitalization rule was adjusted more or less in 1991, 1993, 2002 and 2004, 
respectively, while the statutory corporate tax rate remains unchanged. Based on this 
observation, we assume that the tax rate is fixed when countries choose a tax 
enforcement policy to compete for mobile factors. Doing so could also help us to 
examine the pure effect of the tax enforcement policy competition, and to compare 
our results with previous studies. 
A well-known conclusion is that tax competition will lead to the suboptimal 
under-provision of public goods. Our analysis shows that tax havens may either 
intensify or mitigate this inefficiency, depending on which policy instruments are used 
when facing the rise of tax havens. In the case of TRC, providing the public good (by 
increasing the tax rate) becomes more undesirable for the local policymakers because 
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it not only drives out the capital, but also spurs tax avoidance activities. Therefore the 
existence of tax havens intensifies tax competition and reduces efficiency. However, 
the story changes sharply in the case of TEC. When tax havens are present, the public 
good can also be financed by implementing a stricter enforcement policy. Doing so 
drives out capital in the same way as raising the tax rate, but it weakens the incentives 
to use tax havens. It turns out that in our model the latter effect outweighs the former, 
which leads to the undervaluation of the marginal cost of the public good. Under such 
a situation, the rise of tax havens results in a higher level of the public good.2  
 Our results are related to the growing strand of the literature that supports the 
positive view of tax havens. As an example, Desai et al. (2006a) empirically show that 
the presence of tax havens enables tax planning that lowers the cost of investing in 
non-haven countries, and thus stimulates investment.3 Two studies are closely related 
to the present paper. The first is Hong and Smart (2010), who set up a general 
equilibrium model to evaluate the effect of international tax planning. The main idea 
of their paper is that governments in a small open economy would ideally like to 
impose a positive tax rate on immobile (domestic) firms and a zero tax rate on 
perfectly mobile (multinational) firms, whereas for some practical reasons the 
governments are unable to discriminate against them. Therefore, the existence of tax 
havens potentially improves welfare by giving rise to the desired differential tax 
treatment of the two kinds of firms. The major difference between our paper and 
theirs is that they study the tax planning effect in a “single high-tax country” rather 
                                                 
2
 Two points are worth-noting here. First, we show that tax havens increase public good provision to 
the level above the one without tax havens, but it is not clear whether the level is above the one without 
tax competition. Second, our result is based on the assumption that governments are not allowed to 
change the tax rates. The case in which tax rates and enforcement policies are both at the discretion of 
governments will be considered in Section 4.2. 
3
 Other studies on the positive view of tax havens include Desai et al. (2006b) and Hines (2006). See 
Dharmapala (2008) for a survey of this literature. 
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than in a tax competition game among countries.4 Therefore their analysis essentially 
goes beyond the issue of the under-provision of the public good in tax competing 
countries, which is our focus in this paper.  
 The second paper is Johannesen (2010) who uses a tax competition model to 
show that the presence of tax havens in some cases increases the tax revenues. 
Although the present paper obtains a similar result, it departs from his paper in several 
ways. First, the intuition in Johannesen (2010) is that tax havens make it less 
attractive for countries to set a low tax rate and thus have the effect of mitigating the 
problem of tax competition, whereas the beneficial effect in our model comes from 
another form of tax competition. Second, in his paper tax havens can only improve 
high-tax countries in an asymmetric equilibrium, while our analysis shows that even 
in a symmetric equilibrium, non-haven countries may also benefit from the rise of tax 
havens. Moreover, his paper does not take into consideration the facet of an 
endogenous tax enforcement policy. 
 The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the tax 
competition model with parasitic tax havens. Section 3 introduces two different forms 
of tax competition and shows how they result in diverse tax haven effects. Section 4 
considers some possible extensions of the basic model. Section 5 concludes the paper.  
 
2. The model 
 We consider a small open economy that consists of many identical non-haven 
countries (tax haven jurisdictions will be introduced later). Each country contains a 
constant number of homogeneous residents, which is normalized to unity. Given the 
symmetry, subscripts denoting countries are omitted to simplify the notation. Each 
resident is endowed with 1 unit of labor and k  units of capital. The labor input is 
                                                 
4
 See Hong and Smart (2010), footnote 7.  
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internationally immobile while the capital input is internationally mobile. The wage 
income is w  and the capital return is r . Accordingly, the private consumption, 
denoted by x , of a representative resident can be written as krwx += . In addition, 
the utility function of the representative resident is assumed to be of the form: 
  )(gZxu += ,            (1)5 
where g  denotes the supply of a public good, which is financed by a tax on mobile 
capital. The function )(⋅Z  measures the residents’ preference for the public good and 
is assumed to have the properties that 0>gZ  and 0<ggZ  for all 0≥g  and also 
∞=→ gg Z0lim  (where a subscript denotes the partial differential).  
 Each country contains a large number of perfectly competitive firms, which use a 
constant returns-to-scale technology to produce a single output. Firms are identical so 
that we normalize the number of firms to unity. In particular, we assume the owners of 
capital (investors) create firms, and then hire labor and decide whether to shift income 
to tax havens.6 The production function is )(kf  and satisfies the standard properties 
0>kf  and 0<kkf  where k  is the amount of capital used for production.7  
 We now turn to formulate how the firms utilize tax havens to avoid taxation. Our 
formulations of tax havens are mostly close to those in Slemrod and Wilson (2009) 
and Haufler and Runkel (2012). We assume that, besides the non-haven countries, 
there may exist a number of jurisdictions referred to as tax havens, which offer the 
firms in non-haven countries the opportunities for international tax planning. To be 
more specific, the firms in non-haven countries can set up an affiliate that is located in 
a tax haven jurisdiction. This subsidiary in a tax haven can make an intra-company 
loan to the producing parent in the non-haven country. The interest paid for this loan 
                                                 
5
 Lockwood and Makris (2006) and Lai (2010) use a similar specification.  
6
 The purpose of this assumption is to model tax avoidance behavior at the firm level. A similar setting 
could be found in Slemrod and Wilson (2009) and Haufler and Runkel (2012).  
7
 For simplicity, the fixed labor input is omitted in the production function.  
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is deductible from the tax base in the host country. We assume that tax havens impose 
no taxes, and thus the interest income in tax havens is entirely untaxed. Hence by 
directing interest payments to tax havens, the firms are capable of lowering their tax 
burden (known as “interest stripping”).8 In addition, to simplify the analysis we 
assume the tax havens are small in the sense that any net flows of capital between tax 
havens and non-haven countries are relatively minor and thus would not affect the 
capital and labor employed in the system of non-haven countries as a whole.9 
Moreover, the populations and any productive activities in tax havens are neglected in 
the model. 
 The governments of non-haven countries levy an ad valorem tax t  on capital to 
finance the public good.10 Hence, the profit function of the representative firm is 
written as: 
  ( ) [1 (1 ) ] ( , , , )f k s t rk w P s rk vpi α= − + − − − ,      (2) 
0,0,0 >>> αPPP rks . 
In (2), s  denotes the firm’s interest stripping behavior, and thus the amount of srk  
is deductible from the tax base. The function )(⋅P  denotes the total cost associated 
with the tax avoidance activities, and can be interpreted as the total agency cost, the 
accounting fee required to research the tax codes, or the setup cost needed to establish 
an affiliate in a tax haven. As stated in (2), the cost function is directly increasing in 
the interest stripping behavior s  and the amount of interest payment rk . The 
parameter α  is a policy variable that describes the strictness of the tax enforcement 
policy implemented by the government to regulate the use of tax havens. A larger α  
                                                 
8
 Strictly speaking, interest stripping is a tax avoidance activity, and not tax planning. For the major 
difference between tax planning and tax avoidance, interested readers could consult Ulph (2009). 
9
 This treatment is based on the observations that tax havens tend to be very small jurisdictions (see, 
e.g., Hines and Rice, 1994; Dharmapala and Hines, 2009). See also Slemrod and Wilson (2009) for a 
more detailed discussion of this specification.  
10
 As in most of the tax competition literature, it is assumed that the capital tax follows the “source 
principle”. That is, the government taxes only the capital income earned within its borders. 
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represents a stricter enforcement policy (the government allows for less use of tax 
havens). Accordingly, the relationship 0>αP  is warranted to capture the effect that a 
stricter enforcement policy results in more cost required to engage in tax avoidance 
activities and thus depress the incentives to avoid the tax.11 Finally, 0≥v  is an 
exogenous parameter that denotes the number (or scale) of available tax havens. To 
make our analysis tractable, we specify )(⋅P  as taking a simple form that satisfies all 
the properties discussed above, given by: 
21 ( ) 0
2 ( , )( , , , )
0 ( ) 0
s rk if
vP s rk v
if
ϕ
ϕ αα
ϕ
 ⋅ ≠=  ⋅ =
,     (3)12 
where the function )(⋅ϕ  satisfies the following properties. 
Assumption 1. ( ,0) 0ϕ α = , ( ,0) 0αϕ α = , 0αϕ <  for all 0≠v , and 1( ) tϕ −⋅ ≤  for 
any ),( vα .  
 As we will see later in (5), the last inequality guarantees that the proportion of 
the interest payment shielded cannot be greater than unity. The first-order condition of 
the representative firm is: 
  
21( ) [1 (1 ) ]
2 ( , )kf k r s t svϕ α= + − + ,       (4) 
  ( , )s v tϕ α= .            (5) 
To simplify the subsequent notation and for future use, we define ρ  as the gross 
user cost of capital and thus we have 2[1 / 2]r t tρ ϕ= + − . 
 We see clearly in (5) that the firm’s choice of interest stripping is positively 
related to t : a higher capital tax rate increases the firm’s incentive to avoid taxation; 
                                                 
11
 One example of α is the thin capitalization rule. However, it should be noted that Hong and Smart 
(2010) and Haufler and Runkel (2012) model the thin capitalization rule as a direct (binding) upper 
bound for the firm’s debt limit. Alternatively, in this paper we model the policy effect of enforcement 
policy as indirectly affecting the cost associated with tax avoidance activities. In fact, there is evidence 
suggesting that the effect of the thin capitalization rule is limited in magnitude due to the availability to 
the firm of other tax planning strategies (Weichenrieder and Windischbauer, 2008).  
12
 The assumption that the total costs of tax avoidance activities are linear in the tax base simplifies the 
analysis considerably. See Stöwhase (2005) and Stöwhase and Traxler (2005) for this point.  
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while it is negatively related to α : a stricter enforcement policy increases the 
operating cost and reduces tax avoidance activities. It can also be seen that 0→s  if 
v  approaches zero. This result is obvious because with the absence of tax havens, the 
firm simply cannot engage in any tax avoidance activities by making use of tax 
havens.  
 With perfectly mobile capital and the assumption of a small open economy, the 
rate of return on capital must be the same across countries and determined in the 
worldwide capital market. Accordingly, the rate of return on capital is regarded as 
fixed by an individual country. 
 Then we derive the policy effects of t  and α  on the amount of capital 
employed, which follow from (4) and (5): 
  
(1 ( ) ) 0
kk
k t r
t f
ϕ∂ − ⋅= <
∂
,          (6) 
  
2
0
2 kk
r tk
f
αϕ
α
−∂ = ≤
∂
.           (7) 
A higher tax rate or a stricter enforcement policy lowers the capital returns and thus 
drives out capital. Note that 0/ =∂∂ αk  if there are no available tax havens.  
 In addition, the equilibrium wage must adjust to the point where it is optimal for 
the firm to hire one unit of labor, that is: 
  )()( kfkkfw k−= .          (8)13 
 Finally, the government uses the capital tax revenue to finance the public good. 
The government budget constraint is thus: 
  rtksg )1( −= .            (9) 
 It should be noted that our basic model assumes that implementing a stricter 
enforcement policy is costless (see, e.g., Peralta et al. 2006; Hansen et al. 2006). In 
                                                 
13
 The wage equation (8) can be obtained by substituting (3), (4), and (5) into (2) and imposing the 
zero-profit condition. The same specification may be found in, e.g., Brueckner (2000), Lockwood and 
Makris (2006), and Lai (2010). 
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Section 4.1 we will introduce enforcement costs.  
 
3. Tax haven effects on public good provision 
 This section examines the effect of tax havens on the public good provision and 
welfare. In the initial equilibrium, there are no tax havens in the economy. Each 
country chooses the capital tax rate to finance the public good and compete for mobile 
capital. Specifically, an individual country chooses t  to maximize the social welfare 
(1) under the condition ( ,0) 0ϕ α = . The first-order condition is thus 
0// =∂∂⋅+∂∂ tgZtx g , and rearranging yields the familiar equation: 
1
1
1
−



+−= t
tZ Ng
ε
,           (10) 
where 0)/)(/( >∂∂−= kk ρρε  is the elasticity of capital demand, and NgZ  denotes 
the marginal utility of the public good under the initial (no-haven) equilibrium 
condition. Equation (10) implicitly defines the equilibrium public good in the absence 
of tax havens, which is denoted by Ng . Moreover, we impose the following 
assumption to ensure that the marginal utility of the public good is positive.  
Assumption 2. (1 )t
t
ε
+
< . 
 Then, tax havens arise. We consider two distinct scenarios. The first scenario is 
that governments confronting the rise of tax havens change the tax rate in response 
(TRC), and the second scenario is that they shift to vary their enforcement policies in 
response (TEC).  
 
3.1. Capital tax rate competition (TRC) 
 In the case of TRC, an individual country chooses t  to maximize (1) as in the 
initial equilibrium except that ϕ  is no longer zero with the existence of tax havens. 
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The optimization condition requires: 
1
2
(1 )1
1 1 2
R
g
t t tZ
t t t
ϕ ε ϕ
ϕ ϕ
− −= − − − + −  ,        (11) 
where RgZ  denotes the marginal utility of the public good under the TRC equilibrium 
condition. The tax rate and the provision of the public good are defined 
simultaneously from the system of (9) and (11). To obtain a tractable result, we 
impose: 
Assumption 3. 
2
1 2 0
2
t
t
ϕϕ− − > . 
This assumption enables us to focus on the case in which the interest stripping 
behavior ( )s tϕ=  is not too pronounced.14 Moreover, it also ensures that, given k  
and ρ , a higher tax rate increases the tax revenues and thus the provision of the 
public good. Accordingly, we can establish the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 1. Supposing that Assumptions 1-3 hold, then in an economy where each 
country uses the capital tax rate to compete for mobile capital, the rise of tax havens 
results in a lower equilibrium level of the public good.  
Proof: See Appendix A.  
 
 Proposition 1 reports the same conclusion as that in Slemrod and Wilson (2009). 
The intuition can be briefly explained as follows. It is well known that, in a tax 
competition model, inefficiency emerges because the marginal benefit (MB) of the 
public good exceeds the marginal resource cost (MC) to offset the negative impact of 
the capital outflow induced by a higher tax rate. This outflow is regarded as a positive 
                                                 
14
 Supposing that t=0.5, Assumption 3 means that s cannot be larger than 0.44, which is a quite loose 
assumption. For example, in the numerical analysis by Haufler and Runkel (2012), s is smaller than 
0.34.  
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externality for other countries (as a form of capital inflow) and thus indicates that the 
public good provision is inefficiently low. When tax havens are introduced, this 
inefficiency is aggravated because the MB needs to exceed the MC by even more to 
further compensate for the tax-induced tax avoidance (note that tax avoidance 
activities increase with the capital tax rate). Hence the problem of under-provision of 
the public good is worsened in the presence of tax havens if countries use the capital 
tax rate as a policy instrument to attract capital.  
 
3.2. Tax enforcement policy competition (TEC) 
 Now we turn to investigate the public good effect of tax havens if the countries 
compete for capital by choosing an enforcement policy. In the case of TEC, an 
individual country chooses α  to maximize its social welfare, which gives: 
  0=
∂
∂+
∂
∂
αα
gZx Eg ,           (12) 
where EgZ  denotes the marginal utility of the public good in the case of TEC. 
Rewriting (12) yields: 
  
1
2
(1 )2
1 / 2
E
g
t tZ
t t
ε ϕ
ϕ
− −= − + −  .         (13) 
Given t , (13) implicitly defines the equilibrium public good in the presence of tax 
havens in the case of TEC, which is denoted by Eg . 
 We now compare Eg  with Ng  by comparing the magnitudes of EgZ  and 
N
gZ . 
Note that, in the TEC case, the tax rate is the same as that before the rise of tax havens. 
In the Appendix we will demonstrate that 0<− Ng
E
g ZZ . The property 0<ggZ  and 
N
g
E
g ZZ <  indicates that NE gg > . Hence we have the following proposition: 
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Proposition 2. Supposing that Assumptions 1-2 hold, then in an economy where each 
country confronting the rise of tax havens uses the tax enforcement policy in response, 
the rise of tax havens results in a higher equilibrium level of the public good.  
Proof: See Appendix B.  
 
 The result that different forms of tax competition lead to distinct tax haven 
effects on the public good is somewhat surprising and thus needs detailed discussion. 
The main reason lies in the diverse policy impacts on tax avoidance activities. To be 
more specific, to finance a unit rise in the public good, the government can either 
raise the capital tax rate or implement a stricter enforcement policy. A key difference 
between the impacts of the two policy instruments is that a higher tax rate increases 
the incentive to avoid the tax, whereas a stricter enforcement policy reduces such an 
incentive. In the case of TRC, as discussed previously, the existence of tax havens 
results in a higher MC of the public good (from the individual country’s viewpoint) 
because the local policymaker takes into account the negative impact of capital tax on 
tax avoidance. Hence tax havens lead to a deterioration of the problem associated with 
the under-provision of public goods in a standard tax competition model.  
 The story, however, changes dramatically when countries engage in TEC. When 
tax havens exist, enforcement policies become valid to finance the public good. As in 
the case of TRC, a stricter enforcement policy causes capital to flow out so that the 
MC of the public good is overrated from the local policymaker’s viewpoint. However, 
a stricter enforcement policy differs from a higher capital tax rate in that it can have 
an additional impact to depress tax avoidance activities, which leads to a lower MC of 
the public good for the local policymaker. It turns out that in our model the latter 
effect outweighs the former effect so that the MC is underrated as a whole. Therefore, 
the existence of tax havens leads to a positive effect on the public good provision and 
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thus mitigates the under-provision of the public good in tax competition models.   
 Proposition 2 implies that in an economy where each country, in confronting the 
rise of tax havens, adjusts the tax enforcement policy in response, the rise of tax 
havens is not necessarily welfare-reducing since it may mitigate the under-provision 
of the public good. If the weight of the public good in the utility function is 
sufficiently large, the rise of tax havens could improve social welfare. Our result thus 
supports the recent view of a beneficial tax haven.  
 
4. Extensions and discussions 
4.1. Enforcement costs 
 Thus far we have assumed that implementing an enforcement policy does not 
require any resource costs. In this subsection we relax this assumption and extend the 
basic model to incorporate an enforcement cost. Let )(αe  denote the cost associated 
with the enforcement policy ( 0>αe ). The government budget constraint is rewritten 
as: 
  rtkseg )1()( −=+ α .          (14) 
Utilizing (14) and (12), the marginal utility of the public good in the case of TEC with 
a positive enforcement cost, denoted by EgZˆ , becomes: 
  
1
2 2
2(1 )
ˆ 2
1 / 2
E
g
et tZ
t t rt k
α
α
ε ϕ
ϕ ϕ
− −= − + + − 
.        (15) 
Making an comparison between (15) and (13) yields EgEg ZZ ˆ< . This indicates that, 
not surprisingly, introducing a positive cost of enforcement policy reduces the 
equilibrium public good provision. However, what concerns us is whether the 
existence of tax havens could increase the public good when the enforcement cost is 
taken into consideration. To examine this question, we can compare the values of EgZˆ  
 14 
with NgZ , which gives: 
  
2
2 2
2(1 / 2)
ˆ ˆ 1 (1 )(1 / 2)
E N E N
g g g g
et tZ Z Z Z
t t t rt k
α
α
εϕ
ϕ ϕ
 +− = − − − + + − 
.   (16) 
 The sign of (16) is uncertain, indicating an ambiguous effect of tax havens on the 
public good provision. We do not try to derive a parameter condition to determine the 
sign of (16) since we have not assumed the explicit functional form of )(⋅e  and ( )ϕ ⋅ . 
Some remarks, however, could be made on the implications revealed from (16). First, 
a higher marginal enforcement cost ( αe ↑) makes a stricter enforcement policy more 
undesirable and thus leans more toward a negative tax haven effect on the public good. 
Second, a stricter enforcement policy can restore more tax revenues if the capital 
endowment is large ( k ↑); hence a larger capital endowment is associated with a 
positive tax haven effect on the public good. Third, if the enforcement policy is more 
effective ( αϕ ↑, i.e., a stricter enforcement policy can reduce more tax avoidance 
activities), the MC of the public good is lower for the local jurisdiction. Under such a 
situation, tax havens are more likely to increase the public good provision. We 
summarize the above discussion by establishing the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 3. In the case of TEC with a positive enforcement cost, the rise of tax 
havens can either result in a higher or lower level of the public good in equilibrium.  
In particular, tax havens are more likely to increase the level of the public good if (i) 
the marginal enforcement cost is lower; (ii) the initial capital endowment is larger; or 
(iii) the enforcement policy is more effective. 
 
4.1.1. A simple numerical example 
 This subsection presents a simple numerical simulation to illustrate the results in 
 15 
a model with an enforcement cost. In doing so we need to assign specific functional 
forms of the utility, production and cost functions. We first assume a simple 
preference for the public good, ( ) log( )Z g gη= , 0η > . The production function is 
specified to be of the form 2( )f k ak bk= − , which is in line with the numerical 
analysis in Haufler and Runkel (2012). Moreover, the function associated with the 
costs for tax avoidance ( , )vϕ α  is assumed to be / ( )v cϕ α= +  where the 
parameter c  captures the cost of interest stripping without any policy intervention. 
The cost function associated with the enforcement policy is assumed to be 
2( )e α χα= . For the parameterization we consider the following values: 3a = , 
0.25b = , 5c = , 0.001χ = , 1η = , 1k = , and 0v =  is used to represent the case 
of no tax havens while 1v =  represents the cases of TRC and TEC.15 We examine 
how the public good provision and welfare level will react following a rise in tax 
havens under different types of tax competition.16 The numerical results are reported 
in Table 1. Under the chosen parameter values, we can see that with the presence of 
the enforcement cost, TEC performs better than TRC in terms of the levels of the 
public good and welfare, but performs worse than for the case where there are no tax 
havens. 
Table 1. 
 No tax havens TRC with tax havens TEC with tax havens 
Public good 0.7576 0.7117 0.7132 
Welfare 1.7148 1.6706 1.6711 
 
4.2. A two-stage competition game 
 Our basic model assumes that tax rates are set not only prior to enforcement 
policies, but also before the rise of tax havens. In reality, after the rise of tax havens, 
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 We set a=3 and b=0.25 following Haufler and Runkel (2012), which implies that the elasticity of 
capital demand ( / )( / )k kε ρ ρ= − ∂ ∂  can be calculated as 0.8. 
16
 The details of the numerical process are provided in Appendix C.  
 16 
countries may first adjust the tax rate and then adjust the enforcement policies. If this 
is the case, a more appropriate approach would involve the study of a two-stage 
competition game, in which the governments, as they face the rise of tax havens, set 
tax rates in the first stage and set the enforcement policies in the second stage. In this 
subsection we will discuss whether our results are tenable under the two-stage 
competition game. 
 The two-stage model can be solved by backward induction. First, let us define 
0t  as the initial tax rate (without the presence of tax havens). Tax havens arise in 
stage 0.5. In stage 1 governments adjust the tax rate and 1t  is the tax rate determined 
in this stage. Lastly, in stage 2 governments choose enforcement policies to maximize 
country welfare taking as given the previously determined tax rate 1t . The optimal 
condition would be: 
  
1
1 1
2
1 1
(1 )2
1 / 2g
t tZ
t t
ε ϕ
ϕ
− −= − + − 

,         (17) 
where a tilde hereafter refers to the solutions to the two-stage game.  
 Our main focus is to examine the impact of tax havens on the public good 
provision. Hence we need to compare (17) with the optimal condition of the provision 
of public goods without tax havens, i.e., [ ] 10 01 / (1 )NgZ t tε −= − + . Accordingly we 
have: 
 
2 2
1 1
1 0 0 0 1(1 )(1 ) (2 ) ( )2 2
N N
g g g g
t tZ Z Z Z t t t t tϕ ϕ ε ε − = − ϒ + − + + + + −  
   
,  (18) 
where 2 10 1 1[(1 )(1 / 2)] 0t t tϕ −ϒ = + + − > . 
 The uncertain sign of (18) means that under a two-stage competition game, we 
cannot be sure whether tax havens result in a higher or lower level of public good 
provision. However, we also notice that 0Ng gZ Z− <   if 0 1t t> . In words, if the tax 
 17 
rate determined in stage 1 is lower than the initial tax rate, the rise of tax haven 
increases the equilibrium public good provision. We argue that 0 1t t>  is quite likely 
to be the case because under the traditional TRC game (stage 1), tax havens intensify 
tax competition and thus countries will tend to set a lower tax rate. In a nutshell, 
although we need further specific functional forms to obtain the mathematical 
conditions, the basic logic that TEC implies the possibility for the positive effect of 
tax havens on public good provision remains the same. 
 
4.3. Information sharing  
 In reality the implementation of many enforcement policies requires information 
sharing between national tax authorities and, in particular, tax havens.17 This means 
that information sharing could be highly relevant, especially in a TEC game with tax 
havens. It is worthwhile, therefore, discussing the possible implications of this facet. 
To put it plainly, the issue on information sharing is beyond the scope of the present 
framework because our model ignores any decision-making in tax havens. For the 
issue to be properly addressed, we shall resort to a model that considers tax 
competition between a large country and a tax haven (see, for example, Krautheim 
and Schmidt-Eisenlohr, 2011), in which each government first decides the level of 
information provided to the other government and then decides the level of taxation  
or the enforcement policies (see, for example, Bacchetta and Espinosa, 1995; Makris, 
2003).18  
 With the exchange of information as a choice variable for tax authorities and tax 
havens, several interesting debates can be studied. First, one could use the model to 
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 See Keen and Ligthart (2006) for a primary understanding of the interaction between information 
sharing and tax competition. 
18
 The previous literature on information sharing and tax competition generally adopts a two-stage 
game because the decisions regarding the exchange of information often require specific mechanisms, 
which are long-run in nature, be set up.  
 18 
interpret the observation that large countries tend to exchange more information while 
tax havens prefer not to do so. Second, as tax havens share less information, the 
implementation of enforcement policies in high-tax countries would be more difficult 
compared to the case with full information. The difficulty in exchanging information 
can also be thought of as one kind of enforcement cost. In view of this, the possibility 
for the stimulating effect of tax havens on public goods in the TEC game is expected 
to decline (see the discussion in Section 4.1). Lastly, under the framework one can 
also investigate whether cooperation in information sharing improves the global 
welfare.19 If the answer is yes, some mechanisms are required to achieve such a 
cooperation because essentially tax havens have little incentive to volunteer the 
information. We shall leave these interesting topics to future research.  
 
5. Conclusion  
 In this paper, we present a tax competition model in which governments can 
choose the tax enforcement policy as competing for mobile capital, and use it to 
examine the impacts of tax havens on the public good and social welfare. The main 
finding is that tax havens may possibly increase the equilibrium public good and thus 
enhance social welfare if countries facing the rise of tax havens change their 
enforcement strategies in response.  
The purpose of this paper is not to “compare” the two competition regimes. In 
fact, these two regimes are not fairly comparable because in the TEC and in the case 
of no tax havens, there is no scope for competition. Instead, we present a story of how 
the utilization of tax enforcement policies may counteract the under-provision of 
public goods caused by tax havens. More importantly, while in the standard tax 
                                                 
19
 Intuitively one may expect that cooperation in information sharing is welfare-improving. However, 
Makris (2003) surprisingly shows that such cooperation does not matter in equilibrium outcomes. He 
therefore argues that there is no need for such cooperation. 
 19 
competition model tax havens cannot increase the public goods of high-tax countries, 
this analysis provides a possible explanation for the recent empirical evidence that the 
corporate tax revenues in high-tax countries have actually increased with the growth 
in the flow of FDI to tax havens.  
 Finally, we remark on the limitations of our study. First, to examine the pure 
effect of a tax enforcement policy, we have assumed that tax rates are fixed in the tax 
enforcement competition game. One could also allow countries to simultaneously 
alter the tax rates and the enforcement policies (e.g., Cremer and Gahvari, 2000; 
Peralta et al., 2006) and to investigate the mixed results. Second, we have examined 
the effect on the public good and welfare of an exogenous rise in tax havens. An 
interesting extension would be to consider heterogeneous countries and to endogenize 
the determination of becoming a tax haven. More fruitful results may be obtained if 
the analysis is extended to include this issue.  
 
Appendix A: Proof of Proposition 1 
We first derive the effect of raising the tax rate on the private consumption and the 
public good. This can be done by differentiating x  and g  with respect to t  and 
inserting (4), (5), (6) and (8). Thus we have: 
 (1 ( ) )x r t k
t
ϕ∂ = − − ⋅
∂
,           (A1) 
 
(1 )(1 ) (1 ) (1 2 ) (1 )
kk
g k t r
tk t k t t r t k t t r
t t f
ϕϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ
 ∂ ∂ − = − + − + − = − + −  ∂ ∂   
 
2
2
(1 )1 2
1 / 2
t
t rk
t t
ε ϕϕ
ϕ
 −= − − + −  .         (A2) 
 The government chooses the tax rate to maximize the representative household’s 
utility taking as given its budget constraint: 
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 max ( )
t
u x Z g= + ,  s.t. (1 )g s rtk= − .        (A3) 
The optimization condition can thus be obtained by solving 0// =∂∂⋅+∂∂ tgZtx g . 
Substituting (A1) and (A2) into the above equation yields: 
 2
2
1
(1 )1 2
1 / 2
R
g
x ttZ g t t
tt t t
ϕ
ε ϕϕ
ϕ
∂ −∂= − =∂ −− −∂ + −
.        (A4) 
By rearranging (A4) we can obtain (11) in the text. The tax rate and the provision of 
the public good are defined simultaneously from the system of (9) and (11). We 
define: 
 2
(1 )( , )
1 / 2
t tg H t k
t t
ϕϕ ρ
ϕ
−
= =
+ −
,         (A5) 
 ( , )RgZ h t ϕ= =
1
2
(1 )1
1 1 2
t t t
t t t
ϕ ε ϕ
ϕ ϕ
− −− − − + −  .       (A6) 
From (A5) and (A6) we can obtain the following: 
 
2
2 2
(1 2 / 2)
(1 / 2)t
k t tH
t t
ρ ϕ ϕ
ϕ
− −
=
+ −
, 
2
2 2
( 2) 0
2(1 / 2)
kt tH
t tϕ
ρ
ϕ
+
= − <
+ −
, 
 
2
2 2 2 2
1 (1 2 / 2)
(1 ) (1 / 2)t
t th
t t t
ϕ ε ϕ ϕ
ϕ ϕ
 − −= + ∆ + + −  , 2 2 2 2
1 (1 / 2)
(1 ) (1 / 2)
t t th
t t tϕ
ε
ϕ ϕ
 − += − + ∆ + + −  , 
where 2
(1 )1 0
1 1 2
t t t
t t t
ϕ ε ϕ
ϕ ϕ
−∆ = − − >
− + −
. 
Given Assumption 3, we have 0tH >  and 0th > . Moreover, by Assumption 2 we 
can prove that: 
 
2 2 2 2 2 2
2 2 2 2 2 3 2 4
2 2 2
1 (1 / 2) 1 (1 )(1 / 2)
(1 ) (1 / 2) (1 ) (1 / 2)
2 / 2 2 / 2 3 / 2 / 4
(1 ) (1 / 2)
t t t t
t t t t t t
t t t t t t t
t t t
ε
ϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ
ϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ
ϕ ϕ
+ + +
− + < − +
+ + − + + −
− − − − + + +
=
+ + −
,   (A7) 
which is negative given 1tϕ ≤  and 1t < , and thus indicates that 0hϕ > . 
Next, the implicit function theorem is applied: 
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R
gg tZ dg h dt h dϕ ϕ= + ,           (A8) 
 tdg H dt H dϕ ϕ= + .            (A9)   
 Finally, by utilizing Cramer’s rule, we can derive the relationship  
 
/
/1
R
gg t
t
hdg dZ h
Hdg dtH
ϕ
ϕ
ϕ   −   =    −     
,         (A10) 
or 
 0t tR
t gg t
H h h Hdg
d H Z h
ϕ ϕ
ϕ
− +
= <
− +
.          (A11) 
Thus Proposition 1 is proved. ￭ 
 
Appendix B: Proof of Proposition 2 
We first need to obtain the effects of changing the enforcement policy on the private 
consumption and the public good. Differentiating x  and g  with respect to α  and 
utilizing (4), (5), (7) and (8) yields: 
 
2
2
x r
t kαϕα
∂ =
∂
,            (A12) 
 
2
(1 ) (1 )
2 kk
rtg k
tk t tr tk t trf
α
α α
ϕϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ
α α
 ∂ ∂ = − + − = − − −  ∂ ∂   
 
 
2
2
(1 )1
2(1 / 2)
t t
rt k
t t α
ε ϕ ϕ
ϕ
 −= − + + −  .        (A13) 
 The government adjusts the enforcement policy to maximize the representative 
household’s utility taking as given its budget constraint: 
 max ( )u x Z g
α
= + ,  s.t. (1 )g s rtk= − .        (A14) 
Substituting (A12) and (A13) into (12) yields (13) in the text. Then we compare the 
magnitudes of EgZ  and 
N
gZ : 
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 )( 11 −− −=− EgNgNgEgNgEg ZZZZZZ  
   2
(1 )1 2
1 1 / 2
E N
g g
t t tZ Z
t t t
ε ε ϕ
ϕ
 −= − − + + + −   
   
2 2
(1 )(1 ) (1 ) (1 )(1 ))
2 2
E N
g g
t tZ Z t t t t t t tϕ ϕε ε ϕ = Ω − + + − − + − + + −    
   
2
2(1 )(1 ) (1 ) 0
2 2
E N
g g
t tZ Z t t tϕ εϕ = Ω − + + − − + <   ,   (A15) 
where 2 1[(1 )(1 / 2)] 0t t tϕ −Ω = + + − > . The above equation together with the property 
of 0<ggZ  completes the proof of Proposition 2. ￭ 
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